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Abstract: 
This paper develops a model of endogenous economic growth with special focus on the role of 
unionized labour market and on the interaction between the tax financed productive public 
expenditure and unemployment benefit policy of the government. We incorporate a ‘Managerial’ 
labour union in an otherwise identical Barro (1990) model; and use both ‘Efficient Bargaining’ model 
and ‘Right to Manage’ model to solve the negotiation problem between a labour union and an 
employers’ association. Properties of growth rate maximizing income tax policy are derived in the 
steady state equilibrium; and the effects of unionization are analysed on the level of employment, 
growth rate, welfare and on tax rate respectively. This growth rate maximizing income tax rate 
appears to be higher than (equal to) the competitive output share of public input in the presence 
(absence) of unemployment benefit. Unionisation may be good or bad for the economy in the case of 
Efficient bargaining model; and the nature of the effect depends on the orientation of the labour union. 
However, this is always bad for both employment and growth in the case of a ‘Right to Manage’ 
model.  
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1. Introduction 
 
 There exists a vast literature on the microeconomics of labour union behaviour and 
another on the theory of endogenous economic growth. However, a very small set of works 
combines these two streams to investigate the effect of unionisation on the long run growth 
rate of the economy.1 However, those models do not introduce productive public expenditure; 
and hence can not analyse the role of interaction between tax financed public expenditure and 
unemployment benefit policy on the growth effect of unionisation.  
 The literature on endogenous economic growth with productive public expenditure 
starts with Barro (1990) and includes many other works2. These models analyse the 
optimality of various fiscal policies designed to finance productive public expenditure. 
However, all these models assume competitive labour market and full employment of labour. 
Hence these models can not analyse the distortionary role of providing unemployment benefit 
on the financing of productive public expenditure. There exists strong unionised labour 
market as well as huge amount of spending to run the unemployment benefit scheme in many 
countries, especially in the OECD countries. So it is important to derive optimal tax rate in a 
productive public expenditure model when labour market is unionised and the government 
finances unemployment allowance scheme.  
 Raurich and Sorolla (2003) attempts to analyse the growth effects of fiscal policies in 
the presence of unionised labour market when income taxes finance productive public capital 
accumulation and unemployment benefit. However, this model can not derive any analytical 
properties of optimum fiscal policies; and finally relies on the numerical solution. Only 
Kitaura (2010) derives analytical properties of optimum fiscal policies in the presence of 
labour union, productive public capital accumulation and unemployment subsidy. However, 
his model does not establish any link between unemployment rate and optimal tax policy. 
Additionally, there are few major limitations of each of these two works. In both these two 
works, the monopoly labour union maximises only the average income of workers but does 
not care for the size of membership. None of them introduces bargaining between the labour 
union and the employers’ association; and so they can not analyse the growth effect of 
1 See, for example, Bräuninger (2000), Lingens (2003a, 2003b), Irmen and Wigger (2002/2003), Sorensen 
(1997), Palokangas (1996), Chang et al. (2007), Adjemian et al. (2010), Lai and Wang (2010), Ramos-Parreño 
and Sánchez-Losada (2002) etc.  
2 Futagami et al. (1993), Tsoukis and Miller (2003), Eicher and Turnovsky (2000), Kalaitzidakis and Kalyvitis 
(2004), Cassou and Lansing (1998), Devarajan et al. (1998), Benhabib and Velasco (1996), Economides and 
Philippopoulos (2008), Turnovsky (2000), Greiner (2005), Park and Philippopoulos (2003, 2004), Petraglia 
(2003), Clemens (2001), Chen (2003), Hung (2005), Gupta and Barman (2009, 2010, 2013), Barman and Gupta 
(2010), Agénor (2008), Dasgupta (1999), Baier and Glomm (2001), Cazzavillan (1996), Glomm and Ravikumar 
(1994), Bhattacharyya (2014) are few examples.  
                                                        
unionisation which is defined as an exogenous increase in the relative bargaining power of 
the labour union. Each of them develops Overlapping Generation model and hence can not 
analyse Ramsey optimal solution.   
 Also a set of models derive the properties of optimal unemployment benefit policies 
in dynamic general equilibrium models3. However, these models do not focus on the trade off 
between financing unemployment benefit and financing productive public expenditure; and 
hence can not analyse the role of productive public expenditure on the growth effect of 
unemployment benefit policy.  
 The present paper attempts to combine two different strands of literature. On the one 
hand, it investigates the growth effect and welfare effect of unionisation in the labour market. 
However, on the other hand, it attempts to analyse the optimality of an income tax policy 
designed to finance productive public expenditure in the presence of an unemployment 
benefit policy. The model developed here is an otherwise identical Barro (1990) model where 
the competitive full employment labour market assumption is replaced by wage bargaining 
between a labour union and an employers’ association. This leads to an unemployment 
equilibrium causing a leakage of tax revenue from financing productive public expenditure to 
finance unemployment allowances. In this modified Barro (1990) framework, we use two 
alternative versions of bargaining models – the ‘Efficient Bargaining Model’ of McDonald 
and Solow (1981) and the ‘Right to Manage Model’ of Nickell and Andrews (1983).  
 We derive interesting results from this model. First, the optimum income tax rate in 
this model appears to be higher than (equal to) that obtained in Barro (1990) model in the 
presence (absence) of unemployment allowances. This optimum tax rate varies positively 
with the rate of unemployment benefit and with the level of unemployment. Secondly, the 
endogenous growth rate varies inversely with the rate of unemployment benefit. However, 
welfare level may not vary inversely with this rate; and there may exist a welfare maximising 
rate of benefit. These two results are valid in each of these two bargaining models. Thirdly, 
the nature of effects of unionisation in the labour market on employment level, economic 
growth and welfare level depends on the nature of the bargaining model considered. In the 
case of a ‘Right to Manage Model’, unionisation must have a negative effect on employment 
level and on economic growth irrespective of the orientation of labour union. However, this 
may not be true for the effect on welfare. In the case of an ‘Efficient Bargaining Model’, 
unionisation affects employment level and growth rate ambiguously; and the nature of this 
3 For example, Corneo and Marquardt (2000), Bräuninger (2005), Ono (2010) etc. 
                                                        
effect on employment (growth rate and welfare) depends solely (partially) on the nature of 
orientation of the labour union. Fourthly, the effects of unionisation on the optimum income 
tax rate are also different in these two models. In the ‘Right to Manage’ model, the optimum 
tax rate varies positively with the degree of unionisation. However, in the ‘Efficient 
Bargaining Model’, this may not be true when the labour union is employment oriented. 
 The paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we describe the basic model with 
‘Efficient Bargaining’ and then derive various theoretical results. These results are compared 
to the corresponding results obtained from the ‘Right to Manage’ model in section 3. 
Concluding remarks are made in section 4. 
 
2. The Model 
 
2.1. Firms 
  
 The representative competitive firm produces the final good, Y, using private capital, 
K, labour, L, and public services, G. The production function of the final good is given by            𝑌𝑌 = 𝐹𝐹(𝐾𝐾, 𝐿𝐿,𝐺𝐺) = 𝐴𝐴𝐾𝐾𝛼𝛼𝐿𝐿𝛽𝛽𝐺𝐺1−𝛼𝛼 where A > 0;  𝛼𝛼,𝛽𝛽 ∈ (0,1) and 𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽 < 1 .            (1) 
Here A is time independent. The Cobb-Douglas production function satisfies increasing 
returns to scale in term of all inputs but decreasing returns in terms of private inputs. So a 
positive bargaining power of employers’ association leads to positive profit (rent) generated 
from the bargaining between the labour union and the employers’ association. Following 
Chang et al. (2007), we assume that a fixed factor exists and is needed to set up a plant. So 
the number of firms is fixed in the short-run equilibrium; and is normalized to unity.  
The representative firm’s objective is to maximise its profit, π, defined as  
           𝜋𝜋 = (1 − 𝜏𝜏)𝑌𝑌 − 𝑤𝑤𝐿𝐿 − 𝑟𝑟𝐾𝐾   .                                                                                                     (2)                                                                
Here w, r and τ stand for the wage rate of labour, rental rate on private capital and income tax 
rate respectively4.   
 
2.2. Capital Market 
 
 Private capital market is perfectly competitive. So rental rate on capital is determined 
by demand supply equality in this market. Profit maximizing behaviour of the competitive 
firm leads to the following demand function for capital.           𝑟𝑟 = (1 − 𝜏𝜏)𝐴𝐴𝛼𝛼𝐾𝐾𝛼𝛼−1𝐿𝐿𝛽𝛽𝐺𝐺1−𝛼𝛼 = (1 − 𝜏𝜏)𝛼𝛼𝑌𝑌
𝐾𝐾
     .                                                                      (3) 
4 Here we are assuming that all firms and all inputs of production are properties of households. So profit income 
is also taxable. As there is a single final good, so its price is normalized to unity. 
                                                        
 
2.3. Labour Union’s Objective Function 
 
Following Pemberton (1988) and Chang et al. (2007), we consider a 
‘managerial’ labour union with the utility function given by5           𝑢𝑢𝑇𝑇 = (𝑤𝑤 − 𝑤𝑤𝑐𝑐)𝜂𝜂𝐿𝐿𝜇𝜇    .                                                                                                                   (4)  
Here 𝑢𝑢𝑇𝑇 and 𝑤𝑤𝑐𝑐 denote the utility of the labour union and the competitive wage rate 
respectively. η and 𝜇𝜇 are two non negative preference parameters. If η > ( < ) ( = ) 𝜇𝜇, then the 
labour union is said to be “wage oriented” (“employment oriented”) (“neutral”).6   
 In a competitive labour market, wage is equated to the marginal product of labour; 
and the labour force, normalized to unity, is fully employed7. So the competitive wage rate is 
given by the following equation.           𝑤𝑤𝑐𝑐 = (1 − 𝜏𝜏)𝛽𝛽𝐴𝐴𝐾𝐾𝛼𝛼𝐺𝐺1−𝛼𝛼    .                                                                                                       (5) 
 
2.4. Employment and Wage Determination 
 
In the basic model, we introduce the ‘Efficient Bargaining’ case. Both the 
wage rate and the level of employment are determined by bargaining between the 
nationwide labour union and the nationwide employers’ association.8 The result of the 
bargaining process can be obtained maximizing the ‘generalised Nash product’ 
function which is given by           𝜓𝜓 = ( 𝑢𝑢𝑇𝑇)𝜙𝜙(𝜋𝜋)(1−𝜙𝜙)    .                                                                                                               (6) 
Bargaining disagreement results to zero employment, which, in turn, implies zero profit and 
zero utility. The parameter 𝜙𝜙, satisfying 0 < 𝜙𝜙 < 1, is the relative bargaining power of the 
labour union. Using equations (2) and (3), we have9            𝜋𝜋 = (1 − 𝜏𝜏)(1 − 𝛼𝛼)𝑌𝑌 − 𝑤𝑤𝐿𝐿  .                                                                                                    (7) 
Finally, incorporating equations (1), (4), (5) and (7) into equation (6), we 
obtain  
5 Some models like Chang et al. (2007), Adjemian et al. (2010) etc. take the difference between bargained wage 
rate and the rate of unemployment benefit as the argument in the labour union’s utility function. Contrary to 
this, the difference between bargained wage rate and competitive wage rate is used as an argument in the works 
of Irmen and Wigger (2003), Lingens (2003a) and Lai and Wang (2010).  
6 See Chang et al. (2007) to know more about these parameters. 
7 We assume that the population does not grow overtime.  
8 Details can be seen from Booth (1995). The ‘Right to manage model’ case is discussed in the next section. 
9 In competitive framework, an individual firm takes the rental rate of capital as given while taking decisions 
about labour employment. Here these nationwide employers’ association and nationwide trade union are able to 
internalise the effect of their decision about labour employment on rental rate of capital. So they incorporate the 
capital demand function into the payoff function of the employers’ association. 
                                                        
          𝜓𝜓 = {(𝑤𝑤 − [1 − 𝜏𝜏]𝛽𝛽𝐴𝐴𝐾𝐾𝛼𝛼𝐺𝐺1−𝛼𝛼)𝜂𝜂𝐿𝐿𝜇𝜇}𝜙𝜙{(1 − 𝜏𝜏)(1 − 𝛼𝛼)𝐴𝐴𝐾𝐾𝛼𝛼𝐿𝐿𝛽𝛽𝐺𝐺1−𝛼𝛼 − 𝑤𝑤𝐿𝐿}(1−𝜙𝜙)  .     (8) 
Here 𝜓𝜓 is to be maximised with respect to w and L. Assuming an interior solution, we 
obtain10     
          𝐿𝐿� = �(1 − 𝛼𝛼){𝜙𝜙𝜇𝜇 + 𝛽𝛽(1 − 𝜙𝜙) − 𝜙𝜙𝜙𝜙(1 − 𝛽𝛽)}
𝛽𝛽{𝜙𝜙𝜇𝜇 + (1 − 𝜙𝜙)} � 11−𝛽𝛽   ;                                                          (9) 
and           𝑤𝑤 = {𝜙𝜙𝜇𝜇 + (1 − 𝜙𝜙)𝛽𝛽}(1 − 𝜏𝜏)𝛽𝛽𝐴𝐴𝐾𝐾𝛼𝛼𝐺𝐺1−𝛼𝛼{𝜙𝜙𝜇𝜇 + (1 − 𝜙𝜙)𝛽𝛽 − 𝜙𝜙𝜙𝜙(1 − 𝛽𝛽)} = 𝑋𝑋𝑤𝑤𝑐𝑐       .                                                      (10) 
Here we assume 𝜙𝜙𝜇𝜇 + (1 − 𝜙𝜙)𝛽𝛽 > 𝜙𝜙𝜙𝜙(1 − 𝛽𝛽); and hence            𝑋𝑋 = {𝜙𝜙𝜇𝜇 + (1 − 𝜙𝜙)𝛽𝛽}{𝜙𝜙𝜇𝜇 + (1 − 𝜙𝜙)𝛽𝛽 − 𝜙𝜙𝜙𝜙(1 − 𝛽𝛽)} > 1    .                                                                       (11) 
X represents the ratio of bargained wage to competitive wage; and X = 1 when the union has 
no bargaining power, i.e., the employer is a monopsonist. We assume the following 
parametric restriction.  
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 𝐴𝐴:          − �1 − 𝜙𝜙
𝜙𝜙
+ 𝜙𝜙� < 𝜇𝜇 − 𝜙𝜙
𝛽𝛽
< � 𝛼𝛼1 − 𝛼𝛼 − 𝛽𝛽� �1 − 𝜙𝜙𝜙𝜙 + 𝜙𝜙�   . 
This ensures that 0 < 𝐿𝐿� < 1 and w > 0. Second order conditions of maximization of 𝜓𝜓 are 
also satisfied11.  
 Equation (9) shows that equilibrium level of employment is time independent; and 
equation (10) shows that bargained wage rate is proportional to and is greater than the 
competitive wage rate.   
 
2.5. Government 
 
  The government spends the entire tax revenue to finance unemployment benefits as 
well as productive public expenditure; and so the balanced budget equation is given by            𝜏𝜏𝑌𝑌 = 𝐺𝐺 + 𝑠𝑠(1 − 𝐿𝐿)    .                                                                                                               (12) 
Here s is the amount of unemployment benefit given to an unemployed worker.  
 
2.6. Households 
 
 The representative household derives instantaneous utility from consumption of the 
final good only and not from leisure. She chooses the time path of consumption to maximise 
10 Derivation of equations (9) and (10) from the first order conditions are shown in the appendix A.  
11  For details, see appendix A. 
 
                                                        
her discounted present value of instantaneous utility subject to her intertemporal budget 
constraint. Mathematically the household’s problem is given by the following. 
          𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀� 𝑐𝑐1−𝜎𝜎 − 11 − 𝜎𝜎 𝑒𝑒−𝜌𝜌𝜌𝜌∞
0
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶                                                                                                          (13) 
subject to,     ?̇?𝐾 = 𝑤𝑤𝐿𝐿 + 𝑟𝑟𝐾𝐾 + 𝜋𝜋 + 𝑠𝑠(1 − 𝐿𝐿) − 𝑐𝑐      ;                                                           (14)                          𝐾𝐾(0) = 𝐾𝐾0  ; 
          and       𝑐𝑐 ∈ [0,𝑤𝑤𝐿𝐿 + 𝑟𝑟𝐾𝐾 + 𝜋𝜋 + 𝑠𝑠(1 − 𝐿𝐿)]   .       
Here c is the control variable and K is the state variable. Here 𝜎𝜎 is the elasticity of marginal 
utility with respect to consumption; and ρ is the constant rate of discount. Capital is 
irreversible and does not depreciate. It is assumed that unemployment rate is same for all 
households; and the representative household saves and invests the rest of his income left 
after consumption.  
 Solving this dynamic optimisation problem we obtain the growth rate of 
consumption12, denoted by γ, as given below:           𝛾𝛾 = ?̇?𝑐
𝑐𝑐
= 𝑟𝑟 − 𝜌𝜌 
𝜎𝜎
     .                                                                                                                     (15) 
 
2.7. Optimum Tax Rate 
 
 We assume for simplicity that unemployment benefit per worker is proportional to the 
wage rate. So  
         s = bw                               (16) 
where b is a positive fraction. Using equations (1), (10), (12) and (16), we obtain            𝐺𝐺
𝐾𝐾
= �𝐴𝐴𝜏𝜏𝐿𝐿𝛽𝛽 − 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴(1 − 𝐿𝐿)𝛽𝛽𝑋𝑋(1 − 𝜏𝜏)�1𝛼𝛼  .                                                                               (17) 
Using equations (3), (15) and (17) and then putting L = 𝐿𝐿�, we obtain  
          𝛾𝛾 = 𝐴𝐴1𝛼𝛼(1 − 𝜏𝜏)𝛼𝛼𝐿𝐿� 𝛽𝛽�𝜏𝜏𝐿𝐿� 𝛽𝛽 − 𝐴𝐴�1 − 𝐿𝐿�  �𝛽𝛽𝑋𝑋(1 − 𝜏𝜏)�1−𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼 − 𝜌𝜌 
𝜎𝜎
      .                                     (18) 
 We now turn to derive the growth rate maximising income tax rate; and so we 
maximise the right hand side of equation (18) with respect to τ and then obtain              𝜏𝜏∗ = (1 − 𝛼𝛼)𝐿𝐿� 𝛽𝛽 + 𝐴𝐴(1 − 𝐿𝐿�  )𝛽𝛽𝑋𝑋
𝐿𝐿� 𝛽𝛽 + 𝐴𝐴(1 − 𝐿𝐿� )𝛽𝛽𝑋𝑋 = 1 − 𝛼𝛼𝐿𝐿� 𝛽𝛽𝐿𝐿� 𝛽𝛽 + 𝐴𝐴�1 − 𝐿𝐿�  �𝛽𝛽𝑋𝑋       .                                   (19) 
12 Derivation of equation (15) is given in the appendix B.  
                                                        
Equation (19) shows that the growth rate maximizing tax rate, 𝜏𝜏∗, varies positively with the 
rate of unemployment benefit, b. Here 𝜏𝜏∗ = 1 − 𝛼𝛼 when 𝐴𝐴 = 0.  
 This is an important result because it differs from the corresponding result of Barro 
(1990) in the presence of a positive unemployment benefit. The Barro (1990) result states that 
growth rate maximising tax rate is identical to the elasticity of output with respect to 
productive public services. Barro (1990) does not consider unionised labour market and 
unemployment equilibrium. Our analysis shows that Barro (1990) result is valid even if there 
is an unionised labour market with unemployment equilibrium when the government does not 
finance any unemployment benefit. However, if the government finances unemployment 
benefit with a part of its tax revenue, then growth rate maximising tax rate will be higher than 
the elasticity of output with respect to productive public services. This is obvious because this 
tax revenue not only finances productive public expenditure but also finances unemployment 
benefits.  
 From equation (19), we have            𝜕𝜕𝜏𝜏∗
𝜕𝜕𝐿𝐿�
= −𝛼𝛼𝐴𝐴𝛽𝛽𝑋𝑋𝐿𝐿�𝛽𝛽−1�𝐿𝐿� + 𝛽𝛽[1 − 𝐿𝐿]� �
�𝐿𝐿�𝛽𝛽 + 𝐴𝐴(1 − 𝐿𝐿�)𝛽𝛽𝑋𝑋�2 < 0        .                                                                     (20) 
This implies that 𝜏𝜏∗ varies inversely with the level of employment. This is so due to two 
reasons : (i) Higher level of employment leads to lower expenditure to provide 
unemployment benefit. (ii) Employment and output and hence employment and tax revenue 
(given the tax rate) are positively related to each others. In Kitaura (2010) too, growth rate 
maximising tax rate is higher than the elasticity of output with respect to productive public 
services. However, Kitaura (2010) does not show how 𝜏𝜏∗ varies with the unemployment level 
and with the bargaining power of the labour union.  
 We now turn to analyse its effect on the level of welfare, 𝜔𝜔�. Here  
          𝜔𝜔� = � 𝑐𝑐1−𝜎𝜎 − 11 − 𝜎𝜎 𝑒𝑒−𝜌𝜌𝜌𝜌∞
0
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶    ;                                                                                                     (21) 
and it can be shown13 that  
          𝜔𝜔� = 𝐾𝐾01−𝜎𝜎 �𝜌𝜌�𝐿𝐿�𝛽𝛽 + 𝐴𝐴𝛽𝛽𝑋𝑋�1 − 𝐿𝐿��� + 𝛾𝛾�𝜎𝜎𝐿𝐿�𝛽𝛽 + 𝜎𝜎𝐴𝐴𝛽𝛽𝑋𝑋�1 − 𝐿𝐿�� − 𝛼𝛼𝐿𝐿�𝛽𝛽�𝛼𝛼𝐿𝐿�𝛽𝛽 �1−𝜎𝜎[𝜌𝜌 − 𝛾𝛾(1 − 𝜎𝜎)](1 − 𝜎𝜎)                                                           +𝑐𝑐𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑠𝑠𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶      .                                                                           (22) 
13 Derivation is found in appendix C.  
                                                        
Equation (22) shows that 𝜔𝜔� varies positively with 𝛾𝛾 if 𝜎𝜎𝐿𝐿�𝛽𝛽 + 𝜎𝜎𝐴𝐴𝛽𝛽𝑋𝑋�1 − 𝐿𝐿�� > 𝛼𝛼𝐿𝐿�𝛽𝛽 and 𝜌𝜌 >
𝛾𝛾(1 − 𝜎𝜎). Since 𝐿𝐿� is independent of tax rate, so the growth rate maximising tax rate is 
identical to the social welfare maximising tax rate. We now can establish the following 
proposition.  
 
PROPOSITION 1: The growth rate maximizing income tax rate and welfare maximizing 
income tax rates are identical; and this optimum tax rate exceeds (equals to) the elasticity of 
output with respect to productive public service when the rate of unemployment benefit is 
positive (zero). This optimum tax rate varies positively with the rate of unemployment benefit 
and with the level of unemployment.  
 
2.8. Growth Effect and Welfare Effect of Unemployment Benefit 
 
 Now we turn to analyse the effect of unemployment benefit on the growth rate of the 
economy. From equation (18), we obtain     
          𝜕𝜕𝛾𝛾
𝜕𝜕𝐴𝐴
= −𝐴𝐴1𝛼𝛼(1 − 𝜏𝜏)(1 − 𝛼𝛼)𝐿𝐿� 𝛽𝛽�1 − 𝐿𝐿� �𝛽𝛽𝑋𝑋(1 − 𝜏𝜏) 
𝜎𝜎�𝜏𝜏𝐿𝐿� 𝛽𝛽 − 𝐴𝐴�1 − 𝐿𝐿�  �𝛽𝛽𝑋𝑋(1 − 𝜏𝜏)�2𝛼𝛼−1𝛼𝛼 < 0    .                                               (23) 
Equation (23) shows that, given the tax rate, the growth effect of providing unemployment 
benefit is always negative because denominator of equation (23) is positive as shown by 
equation (17). A rise in b raises expenditure on unemployment benefit; and given the tax rate, 
it causes productive public expenditure to fall14. So growth rate declines with a rise in b; and 
hence the growth rate maximising unemployment benefit rate is either zero or equal to a 
lower limit, 𝐴𝐴�, imposed by the political considerations.  
 From equation (22), we obtain            𝜕𝜕𝜔𝜔�
𝜕𝜕𝐴𝐴
= 𝜔𝜔�
⎩
⎪
⎨
⎪
⎧𝜕𝜕𝛾𝛾
𝜕𝜕𝐴𝐴
�
(1 − 𝜎𝜎)[𝜌𝜌 − 𝛾𝛾(1 − 𝜎𝜎)] + (1 − 𝜎𝜎)�𝜎𝜎𝐿𝐿�𝛽𝛽 + 𝜎𝜎𝐴𝐴𝛽𝛽𝑋𝑋�1 − 𝐿𝐿�� − 𝛼𝛼𝐿𝐿�𝛽𝛽�𝜌𝜌�𝐿𝐿�𝛽𝛽 + 𝐴𝐴𝛽𝛽𝑋𝑋�1 − 𝐿𝐿��� + 𝛾𝛾�𝜎𝜎𝐿𝐿�𝛽𝛽 + 𝜎𝜎𝐴𝐴𝛽𝛽𝑋𝑋�1 − 𝐿𝐿�� − 𝛼𝛼𝐿𝐿�𝛽𝛽��+ (1 − 𝜎𝜎)�𝜌𝜌𝛽𝛽𝑋𝑋�1 − 𝐿𝐿�� + 𝛾𝛾𝜎𝜎𝛽𝛽𝑋𝑋�1 − 𝐿𝐿���
𝜌𝜌�𝐿𝐿�𝛽𝛽 + 𝐴𝐴𝛽𝛽𝑋𝑋�1 − 𝐿𝐿��� + 𝛾𝛾�𝜎𝜎𝐿𝐿�𝛽𝛽 + 𝜎𝜎𝐴𝐴𝛽𝛽𝑋𝑋�1 − 𝐿𝐿�� − 𝛼𝛼𝐿𝐿�𝛽𝛽� ⎭⎪⎬
⎪
⎫   .   
                        (24) 
Equation (24) shows that welfare effect of providing unemployment benefit consists of two 
different effects - a negative growth effect and a positive effect obtained from the increase in 
14 See equation (17).  
                                                        
initial disposable income. So optimum b is not necessarily equal to 𝐴𝐴�; and there may be an 
interior solution of b satisfying 1 > b > 𝐴𝐴� while maximizing welfare. We now establish the 
following proposition.   
 
PROPOSITION 2: Providing unemployment benefit must have a negative effect on 
economic growth though its welfare effect is not necessarily negative.  
 
2.9. Effects of Unionisation15 
 
The economy is always in the steady state equilibrium without any transitional dynamics. At 
equilibrium, 𝐿𝐿�, 𝜏𝜏∗, 𝐴𝐴�, all are time-independent; and 𝛾𝛾 and G/K are also so. So G, K and Y also 
grow at the same rate. w and 𝜋𝜋 also grow at the same rate but r remains time-independent. 
𝜏𝜏∗Y and 𝐴𝐴𝑤𝑤�1 − 𝐿𝐿�� also grow at the same rate.  
Now we turn to analyse how unionisation defined as an exogenous increase in the relative 
bargaining power of the labour union affects economy’s employment, growth rate and 
welfare in the steady-state equilibrium. Chang et al. (2007), Palokangas (1996) etc. also make 
similar analysis in their models without considering the role of productive public expenditure.  
From equation (9), we have           𝜕𝜕𝐿𝐿�
𝜕𝜕𝜙𝜙
= (𝜇𝜇 − 𝜙𝜙)𝐿𝐿�(𝜙𝜙𝜇𝜇 + 1 − 𝜙𝜙){𝜙𝜙𝜇𝜇 + (1 − 𝜙𝜙)𝛽𝛽 − 𝜙𝜙𝜙𝜙(1 − 𝛽𝛽)} ⋛ 0   𝑓𝑓𝐶𝐶𝑟𝑟   𝜇𝜇 ⋛ 𝜙𝜙   .                   (25) 
Equation (25) shows that an increase in the relative bargaining power of the labour union will 
raise (lower) (not affect) the employment level of the economy if the labour union is 
employment oriented (wage oriented) (neutral). Chang et al. (2007) also obtains same result.  
From equations (18) and (19) and putting b = 𝐴𝐴�, we obtain    
          𝛾𝛾|𝑏𝑏 = 𝑏𝑏� = 𝐴𝐴1𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼2𝐿𝐿� 𝛼𝛼𝛽𝛽+𝛽𝛽𝛼𝛼 (1 − 𝛼𝛼)1−𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼  �𝐿𝐿�  𝛽𝛽 + 𝐴𝐴��1 − 𝐿𝐿� �𝛽𝛽𝑋𝑋�𝜎𝜎 − 𝜌𝜌𝜎𝜎       .                                                                        (26) 
From equation (11), we obtain            𝜕𝜕𝑋𝑋
𝜕𝜕𝜙𝜙
= 𝛽𝛽𝜙𝜙(1 − 𝛽𝛽){𝜙𝜙𝜇𝜇 + (1 − 𝜙𝜙)𝛽𝛽 − 𝜙𝜙𝜙𝜙(1 − 𝛽𝛽)}2 > 0       .                                                               (27) 
From equation (26), we have  
          𝜕𝜕𝛾𝛾
𝜕𝜕𝜙𝜙
�
𝑏𝑏 = 𝑏𝑏� = �𝐴𝐴1𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼2(1 − 𝛼𝛼)1−𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼  𝜎𝜎 �� 𝐸𝐸1 𝜕𝜕𝐿𝐿
�
𝜕𝜕𝜙𝜙 − 𝐸𝐸2
𝜕𝜕X
𝜕𝜕𝜙𝜙
�𝐿𝐿�  𝛽𝛽 + 𝐴𝐴��1 − 𝐿𝐿� �𝛽𝛽𝑋𝑋�2�      ;                                     (28) 
15 In this section, we assume that optimum b = 𝐴𝐴�. 
                                                        
where            𝐸𝐸1 = 𝐿𝐿�𝛼𝛼𝛽𝛽+𝛽𝛽𝛼𝛼 𝐴𝐴�𝛽𝛽𝑋𝑋 + 𝛽𝛽𝛼𝛼 𝐿𝐿�2𝛼𝛼𝛽𝛽+𝛽𝛽−𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼 + 𝐴𝐴��1 − 𝐿𝐿�  �𝛽𝛽𝑋𝑋 �𝛼𝛼𝛽𝛽 + 𝛽𝛽𝛼𝛼 � 𝐿𝐿�𝛼𝛼𝛽𝛽+𝛽𝛽−𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼 > 0                    (29) 
and           𝐸𝐸2 = 𝐿𝐿�𝛼𝛼𝛽𝛽+𝛽𝛽𝛼𝛼 𝐴𝐴��1 − 𝐿𝐿� �𝛽𝛽 > 0         .                                                                                          (30) 
Equation (28) shows that the growth effect of unionisation is ambiguous in sign. It partly 
depends on the nature of orientation of the labour union. The first term of the last bracket of 
the R.H.S. of equation (28) depends solely on the sign of 𝜕𝜕𝐿𝐿
�
𝜕𝜕𝜙𝜙
 whereas the second term inside 
that bracket is always negative. So an employment oriented labour union is necessary but not 
sufficient to ensure a positive growth effect of unionisation; and the growth effect is always 
negative if the union is not employment oriented. However, in Chang et al. (2007), an 
employment oriented labour union is necessary as well as sufficient to ensure a positive 
growth effect of unionisation; and the growth effect is negative if and only if the union is 
wage oriented.  
 The intuition behind this result can be explained as follows. Growth effect of 
unionisation in this model consists of two parts. First one comes from employment effect 
whose sign depends on the nature of orientation of the labour union; and this is same as that 
found in Chang et al. (2007). The second one is a negative tax effect; and it is special to the 
present model. Unionisation in the labour market raises negotiated wage rate. So 
unemployment benefit per worker, 𝐴𝐴�w, goes up. So government’s expenditure to provide 
unemployment benefit is increased; and, to finance that expenditure, income tax rate has to 
rise. This reduces the after tax marginal productivity of private capital leading to this negative 
growth effect. This second effect does not exist in Chang et al. (2007) because they do not 
consider productive public expenditure.   
 We now turn to analyse its effect on the level of welfare, 𝜔𝜔�. From equation (22), we 
obtain  
          𝜕𝜕𝜔𝜔�
𝜕𝜕𝜙𝜙
�
𝑏𝑏 = 𝑏𝑏� = 𝜔𝜔� � 𝐸𝐸3 𝜕𝜕𝐿𝐿
�
𝜕𝜕𝜙𝜙 + 𝐸𝐸4 𝜕𝜕X𝜕𝜕𝜙𝜙
�𝐿𝐿� 𝛽𝛽 + 𝐴𝐴��1 − 𝐿𝐿� �𝛽𝛽𝑋𝑋�2�      ;                                                                        (31) 
where           𝐸𝐸3 = (1 − 𝜎𝜎)�𝜌𝜌�𝛽𝛽𝐿𝐿�𝛽𝛽−1 − 𝐴𝐴𝛽𝛽𝑋𝑋� + 𝛾𝛾�𝜎𝜎𝛽𝛽𝐿𝐿�𝛽𝛽−1 − 𝜎𝜎𝐴𝐴𝛽𝛽𝑋𝑋 − 𝛼𝛼𝛽𝛽𝐿𝐿�𝛽𝛽−1��𝜌𝜌�𝐿𝐿�𝛽𝛽 + 𝐴𝐴𝛽𝛽𝑋𝑋�1 − 𝐿𝐿��� + 𝛾𝛾�𝜎𝜎𝐿𝐿�𝛽𝛽 + 𝜎𝜎𝐴𝐴𝛽𝛽𝑋𝑋�1 − 𝐿𝐿�� − 𝛼𝛼𝐿𝐿�𝛽𝛽� − (1 − 𝜎𝜎)𝛽𝛽𝐿𝐿�  
              +� (1 − 𝜎𝜎)[𝜌𝜌 − 𝛾𝛾(1 − 𝜎𝜎)] + (1 − 𝜎𝜎)�𝜎𝜎𝐿𝐿�𝛽𝛽 + 𝜎𝜎𝐴𝐴𝛽𝛽𝑋𝑋�1 − 𝐿𝐿�� − 𝛼𝛼𝐿𝐿�𝛽𝛽�𝜌𝜌�𝐿𝐿�𝛽𝛽 + 𝐴𝐴𝛽𝛽𝑋𝑋�1 − 𝐿𝐿��� + 𝛾𝛾�𝜎𝜎𝐿𝐿�𝛽𝛽 + 𝜎𝜎𝐴𝐴𝛽𝛽𝑋𝑋�1 − 𝐿𝐿�� − 𝛼𝛼𝐿𝐿�𝛽𝛽�� 
                                      .         � 𝐴𝐴1𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼2(1 − 𝛼𝛼)1−𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼  𝐸𝐸1
𝜎𝜎�𝐿𝐿�  𝛽𝛽 + 𝐴𝐴��1 − 𝐿𝐿�  �𝛽𝛽𝑋𝑋�2�          .                                                     (32) 
and           𝐸𝐸4 = (1 − 𝜎𝜎)�𝜌𝜌𝐴𝐴𝛽𝛽�1 − 𝐿𝐿�� + 𝛾𝛾𝜎𝜎𝐴𝐴𝛽𝛽�1 − 𝐿𝐿���𝜌𝜌�𝐿𝐿�𝛽𝛽 + 𝐴𝐴𝛽𝛽𝑋𝑋�1 − 𝐿𝐿��� + 𝛾𝛾�𝜎𝜎𝐿𝐿�𝛽𝛽 + 𝜎𝜎𝐴𝐴𝛽𝛽𝑋𝑋�1 − 𝐿𝐿�� − 𝛼𝛼𝐿𝐿�𝛽𝛽� 
             −� (1 − 𝜎𝜎)[𝜌𝜌 − 𝛾𝛾(1 − 𝜎𝜎)] + (1 − 𝜎𝜎)�𝜎𝜎𝐿𝐿�𝛽𝛽 + 𝜎𝜎𝐴𝐴𝛽𝛽𝑋𝑋�1 − 𝐿𝐿�� − 𝛼𝛼𝐿𝐿�𝛽𝛽�𝜌𝜌�𝐿𝐿�𝛽𝛽 + 𝐴𝐴𝛽𝛽𝑋𝑋�1 − 𝐿𝐿��� + 𝛾𝛾�𝜎𝜎𝐿𝐿�𝛽𝛽 + 𝜎𝜎𝐴𝐴𝛽𝛽𝑋𝑋�1 − 𝐿𝐿�� − 𝛼𝛼𝐿𝐿�𝛽𝛽�� 
                                      .         � 𝐴𝐴1𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼2(1 − 𝛼𝛼)1−𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼  𝐸𝐸2
𝜎𝜎�𝐿𝐿�  𝛽𝛽 + 𝐴𝐴��1 − 𝐿𝐿�  �𝛽𝛽𝑋𝑋�2�          .                                                     (33) 
We can not sign 𝐸𝐸3 and 𝐸𝐸4 when 𝜎𝜎 ≠ 1. In Chang et al. (2007), welfare effect of unionisation 
depends solely on the employment effect. However, our model shows that this is not 
necessarily true in the presence of productive public expenditure. The following proposition 
summarizes the major result.   
 
PROPOSITION 3: Unionisation raises (lowers) (does not affect) the level of employment in 
the efficient bargaining model when the labour union is employment oriented (wage oriented) 
(neutral). However, the growth effect of unionisation depends not only on the nature of 
orientation of the labour union but also on the negative taxation effect. An employment 
(wage) oriented labour union is necessary but not sufficient (sufficient but not necessary) to 
have a positive (negative) growth effect.  
 
 Now we analyse the effect of unionisation on the optimal tax rate. From equation 
(19), we have   
          𝜕𝜕𝜏𝜏∗
𝜕𝜕𝜙𝜙
�
𝑏𝑏=𝑏𝑏�
= 𝛼𝛼𝐿𝐿�𝐴𝐴�(1 − 𝛼𝛼) � 𝜙𝜙(1 − 𝛽𝛽)𝛽𝛽�1 − 𝐿𝐿��[1 − 𝜙𝜙 + 𝜙𝜙𝜇𝜇]−(𝜇𝜇 − 𝜙𝜙)[𝜙𝜙𝜇𝜇 + 𝛽𝛽(1 − 𝜙𝜙)]�𝐿𝐿� + 𝛽𝛽(1 − 𝐿𝐿�)��{𝜙𝜙𝜇𝜇 + 𝛽𝛽(1 − 𝜙𝜙) − 𝜙𝜙𝜙𝜙(1 − 𝛽𝛽)}
�𝐿𝐿�[1 − 𝜙𝜙 + 𝜙𝜙𝜇𝜇] + 𝐴𝐴�(1 − 𝛼𝛼)(1 − 𝐿𝐿�)[𝜙𝜙𝜇𝜇 + 𝛽𝛽(1 − 𝜙𝜙)]�2        .                (34) 
The two terms of the denominator and the first term of the numerator in the R.H.S. of 
equation (34) are positive in sign but the sign of the second term of the numerator depends on 
the nature of the orientation of the labour union. This equation (34) shows that an increase in 
𝜙𝜙 leads to an increase (ambiguous change) in the optimal tax rate when the labour union is 
wage oriented or neutral (employment oriented).   
 Optimum tax rate and the level of employment are inversely related. As union 
becomes more powerful, then negotiated wage rate and hence unemployment benefit per 
worker are increased. This requires an increase in the optimum tax rate to finance the 
unemployment benefits. However, it may increase or decrease the employment level 
depending on labour unions’ orientation; and thus may affect the optimum tax rate 
ambiguously. Employment level is decreased when the union is wage oriented. Models 
available in the existing literature do not incorporate the role of productive public input and 
of unionised labour market simultaneously; and hence the question of the effect of 
unionisation on optimum taxation does not arise there. This result is stated in the following 
proposition.  
 
PROPOSITION 4: Unionisation in the labour market raises optimal tax rate if the labour 
union is wage oriented or neutral. Otherwise, unionisation affects optimal tax rate 
ambiguously.   
 
3. Extension: ‘The Right to Manage Model’ 
 
 In ‘The Right to manage model’ of bargaining, firm’s association and labour union 
bargain over wage only; and employment is determined from the labour demand function 
derived from the profit maximisation exercise of the firm. The inverted labour demand 
function is given by          𝑤𝑤 = (1 − 𝜏𝜏)𝛽𝛽𝐴𝐴𝐾𝐾𝛼𝛼𝐺𝐺1−𝛼𝛼𝐿𝐿𝛽𝛽−1 = 𝑤𝑤𝑐𝑐𝐿𝐿𝛽𝛽−1   .                                                                           (35) 
Using equations (35) and (7), we have             𝜋𝜋 = (1 − 𝜏𝜏)(1 − 𝛼𝛼 − 𝛽𝛽)𝐴𝐴𝐾𝐾𝛼𝛼𝐿𝐿𝛽𝛽𝐺𝐺1−𝛼𝛼    .                                                                               (36) 
 So the ‘generalised Nash product’ function is modified as           𝜓𝜓 = {(𝑤𝑤 − 𝑤𝑤𝑐𝑐)𝜂𝜂𝐿𝐿𝜇𝜇}𝜙𝜙{(1 − 𝜏𝜏)(1 − 𝛼𝛼 − 𝛽𝛽)𝐴𝐴𝐾𝐾𝛼𝛼𝐿𝐿𝛽𝛽𝐺𝐺1−𝛼𝛼}(1−𝜙𝜙)     .                                 (37) 
Here 𝜓𝜓 is to be maximised with respect to w only, subject to equation (35). Since equation 
(35) implies an inverse relationship between w and L, one can maximise 𝜓𝜓 with respect to L 
instead of w subject to equation (35). From the first order condition of maximisation, we 
derive the level of employment and negotiated wage rate as given by16 
16 Second order condition of maximisation of 𝜓𝜓 is also satisfied.  
                                                        
         𝐿𝐿∗ = �{𝜙𝜙𝜇𝜇 + 𝛽𝛽(1 − 𝜙𝜙) − 𝜙𝜙𝜙𝜙(1 − 𝛽𝛽)}{𝜙𝜙𝜇𝜇 + 𝛽𝛽(1 − 𝜙𝜙)} � 11−𝛽𝛽       ;                                                                  (38) 
and           𝑤𝑤 = 𝑤𝑤𝑐𝑐(𝐿𝐿∗)𝛽𝛽−1     .                                                                                                                      (39) 
Condition A ensures that the negotiated wage rate is positive and the level of employment is a 
positive fraction.  
 Negotiated wage rates are same in both these two bargaining models; and this can be 
checked easily using equations (5), (10), (38) and (39).   
 Government’s budget balance equation is same as equation (12). Representative 
household’s optimisation problem is also represented by equations (13) and (14). Solving this 
dynamic optimisation problem, we obtain the similar expression of growth rate as given by 
equation (15). Using equations (1), (5), (12), (16) and (39), we obtain            𝐺𝐺
𝐾𝐾
= �𝐴𝐴𝜏𝜏𝐿𝐿𝛽𝛽 − 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴(1 − 𝐿𝐿)𝛽𝛽𝐿𝐿𝛽𝛽−1(1 − 𝜏𝜏)�1𝛼𝛼      .                                                                     (40) 
Using equations (40), (3) and (15) we obtain   
          𝛾𝛾 = ?̇?𝑐
𝑐𝑐
   = 𝐴𝐴1𝛼𝛼(1 − 𝜏𝜏)𝛼𝛼𝐿𝐿∗𝛽𝛽�𝜏𝜏𝐿𝐿∗𝛽𝛽 − 𝐴𝐴(1 − 𝐿𝐿∗ )𝛽𝛽𝐿𝐿∗𝛽𝛽−1(1 − 𝜏𝜏)�1−𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼 − 𝜌𝜌 
𝜎𝜎
       .               (41) 
Government chooses the tax rate to maximise the growth rate of consumption. Assuming an 
interior solution, we derive the following optimal tax rate           𝜏𝜏̅ = (1 − 𝛼𝛼)𝐿𝐿∗ + 𝐴𝐴(1 − 𝐿𝐿∗)𝛽𝛽
𝐿𝐿∗ + 𝐴𝐴(1 − 𝐿𝐿∗ )𝛽𝛽 = 1 − 𝛼𝛼𝐿𝐿∗𝐿𝐿∗ + 𝐴𝐴(1 − 𝐿𝐿∗ )𝛽𝛽      .                                               (42) 
 From equations (1), (2), (3), (5), (14), (15), (16), (21) and (39), we obtain 
          𝜔𝜔� = 𝐾𝐾01−𝜎𝜎 �𝜌𝜌 + 𝛾𝛾𝜎𝜎𝛼𝛼 �1 + 𝐴𝐴𝛽𝛽 (1 − 𝐿𝐿∗)𝐿𝐿∗ � − 𝛾𝛾�1−𝜎𝜎[𝜌𝜌 − 𝛾𝛾(1 − 𝜎𝜎)](1 − 𝜎𝜎) + 𝑐𝑐𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑠𝑠𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶      .                                   (43) 
Like equation (22), equation (43) also shows that there exists a positive monotonic 
relationship between the welfare level and the growth rate since if 𝜎𝜎
𝛼𝛼
�1 + 𝐴𝐴𝛽𝛽 (1−𝐿𝐿∗)
𝐿𝐿∗
� > 1; and 
this is always true for 𝜎𝜎 > 𝛼𝛼. Since 𝐿𝐿∗ is independent of tax rate, so the growth rate 
maximising tax rate is identical to the social welfare maximising tax rate.  
 Equation (41) shows that γ varies inversely with b. However, equation (43) shows that 
there may exist a welfare maximising interior solution of b. So propositions 1 and 2 are valid 
here too.   
From equation (38), we have  
          𝜕𝜕𝐿𝐿∗
𝜕𝜕𝜙𝜙
= − 𝛽𝛽𝜙𝜙𝐿𝐿∗[𝜙𝜙𝜇𝜇 + 𝛽𝛽(1 − 𝜙𝜙)]{𝜙𝜙𝜇𝜇 + (1 − 𝜙𝜙)𝛽𝛽 − 𝜙𝜙𝜙𝜙(1 − 𝛽𝛽)} < 0      .                             (44) 
This equation (44) implies that an increase in 𝜙𝜙 unambiguously lowers 𝐿𝐿∗ for any set of 
values of parameters η and 𝜇𝜇. This is contrary to the corresponding result obtained in the 
earlier model where the nature of the effect depends on the mathematical sign of (𝜇𝜇 − 𝜙𝜙). 
This is so because, in ‘The Right to Manage Model’, two parties bargain only over wage and 
not over employment. The employer determines the level of employment according to its 
labour demand function.  
 Now using equations (41) and (42), we obtain    
           𝛾𝛾|𝑏𝑏 = 𝑏𝑏� = ?̇?𝑐𝑐𝑐    = 𝐴𝐴1𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼2𝐿𝐿∗(𝛽𝛽+𝛼𝛼)𝛼𝛼 (1 − 𝛼𝛼)1−𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼  �𝐿𝐿∗ + 𝐴𝐴�(1 − 𝐿𝐿∗ )𝛽𝛽�𝜎𝜎 − 𝜌𝜌𝜎𝜎        .                                                          (45) 
From equation (45), we have 
          𝜕𝜕𝛾𝛾
𝜕𝜕𝜙𝜙
�
𝑏𝑏 = 𝑏𝑏� = �𝐴𝐴1𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼2(1 − 𝛼𝛼)1−𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼  𝜎𝜎 ��𝜕𝜕𝐿𝐿
∗
𝜕𝜕𝜙𝜙 �
𝛽𝛽
𝛼𝛼 𝐿𝐿
∗
𝛽𝛽
𝛼𝛼�𝐿𝐿∗ + 𝐴𝐴�(1 − 𝐿𝐿∗ )𝛽𝛽� + 𝐴𝐴�𝛽𝛽𝐿𝐿∗𝛽𝛽𝛼𝛼�
�𝐿𝐿∗ + 𝐴𝐴�(1 − 𝐿𝐿∗ )𝛽𝛽�2 �      .     (46) 
Since all the terms of the right hand side of equation (46) are positive and 𝜕𝜕𝐿𝐿
∗
𝜕𝜕𝜙𝜙
< 0, so 
equation (46) implies that unionisation unambiguously lowers the growth rate of the economy 
for any set of values of η and 𝜇𝜇 whereas the sign of the effect in the ‘Efficient Bargaining’ 
model depends partly on the sign of (𝜇𝜇 − 𝜙𝜙).   
 To analyse its welfare effect, once again we assume that 𝜎𝜎
𝛼𝛼
�1 + 𝐴𝐴𝛽𝛽 (1−𝐿𝐿∗)
𝐿𝐿∗
� > 1. So 
from equation (43), we obtain 
          𝜕𝜕𝜔𝜔�
𝜕𝜕𝜙𝜙
�
𝑏𝑏 = 𝑏𝑏� = 𝜔𝜔�
⎝
⎜
⎜
⎜
⎜
⎛
𝜕𝜕𝛾𝛾
𝜕𝜕𝜙𝜙
�
(1 − 𝜎𝜎)[𝜌𝜌 − 𝛾𝛾(1 − 𝜎𝜎)] + (1 − 𝜎𝜎) �𝜎𝜎𝛼𝛼 �1 + 𝐴𝐴𝛽𝛽 (1 − 𝐿𝐿∗)𝐿𝐿∗ � − 1��𝜌𝜌 + 𝛾𝛾𝜎𝜎𝛼𝛼 �1 + 𝐴𝐴𝛽𝛽 (1 − 𝐿𝐿∗)𝐿𝐿∗ � − 𝛾𝛾� �
−
(1 − 𝜎𝜎) �𝜌𝜌 + 𝛾𝛾𝜎𝜎𝛼𝛼 � 𝐴𝐴𝛽𝛽𝐿𝐿∗2
�
𝜌𝜌 + 𝛾𝛾𝜎𝜎
𝛼𝛼 �1 + 𝐴𝐴𝛽𝛽 (1 − 𝐿𝐿∗)𝐿𝐿∗ � − 𝛾𝛾� 𝜕𝜕𝐿𝐿
∗
𝜕𝜕𝜙𝜙
⎠
⎟
⎟
⎟
⎟
⎞     .      (47) 
Equation (47) shows that welfare effect of unionization is independent of labour union’s 
orientation towards wage or employment which is not true in the efficient bargaining model.       
 Equations (42) and (44) show the inverse relationship between 𝜏𝜏̅ and 𝐿𝐿∗ and the 
inverse relationship between 𝐿𝐿∗ and 𝜙𝜙 respectively. So there is a positive relationship 
between 𝜏𝜏̅ and 𝜙𝜙. This result is also different from the corresponding one obtained in the 
efficient bargaining model where the result depends on labour union’s orientation.   
 We now state the major result in the form of the following proposition. 
 
PROPOSITION 5: In the ‘Right to Manage Model’, unionisation always lowers the level of 
employment as well as the rate of endogenous growth but raises the optimal tax rate. 
However, the welfare effect of unionisation, though independent of union’s orientation, is 
ambiguous in sign.  
 
4. Conclusion 
 
 This paper, on the one hand, investigates the growth effect and welfare effect of 
unionisation in the labour market in the presence of productive public expenditure; and, on 
the other hand, analyses the properties of optimum income tax policy to finance productive 
public expenditure and unemployment benefit. The Barro (1990) model is extended by 
incorporating collective bargaining between the labour union and the employers’ union 
resulting into an unemployment equilibrium. We use two alternative versions of bargaining 
models – the ‘Efficient Bargaining Model’ of McDonald and Solow (1981) and the ‘Right to 
Manage Model’ of Nickell and Andrews (1983).  
 Our major findings are as follows. First, the optimum rate of proportional income tax, 
that finances productive public expenditure as well as unemployment benefit, is found to be 
higher than that in the models of Barro (1990), Futagami et al. (1993); and its magnitude 
depends on the unemployment level, labour union’s bargaining power and orientation of the 
labour union. Secondly, the endogenous growth rate of the economy varies inversely with the 
rate of unemployment benefit though social welfare may not. Both these two results are valid 
in each of these two bargaining models. Thirdly, how unionisation affects employment, 
economic growth and welfare depends on the nature of the bargaining model considered. In 
the ‘Right to Manage Model’, unionisation must have a negative effect on employment and 
growth regardless of the orientation of the labour union. However, welfare may increase due 
to unionisation. On the contrary, the nature of these effects at least partially depends on the 
nature of orientation of the labour union in the ‘Efficient Bargaining Model’. Growth effects 
and welfare effects are not necessarily positive even if the union is employment oriented; and 
the growth effect is always negative if the union is neutral or wage oriented. Our results are 
different from those found in Chang et al. (2007). Fourthly, unionisation raises the optimal 
tax rate in the ‘Right to Manage’ model but affects it ambiguously in the ‘Efficient 
Bargaining Model’. This point is not interesting in Chang et al. (2007) where there is no 
productive public expenditure to be financed by taxation.  
 However, our model is abstract and fails to consider many aspects of reality. We 
assume public expenditure as a flow variable and hence do not consider the role of public 
capital accumulation. We also rule out the possibility of human capital accumulation, 
population growth, technological progress, environmental degradation etc. Hence the 
allocation of government’s budget and of household’s income to education, R&D, pollution 
abatement etc. is not analysed here. One sector aggregative framework considered here fails 
to highlight the structural inter-relationship among different sectors. We ignore membership 
dynamics of labour union and the union’s concern about worker’s safety, health and 
workplace environment. We plan to do further research in future attempting to remove these 
limitations. 
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Appendix 
Appendix A 
Derivation of equations (9) and (10): 
From equations (8) and (5), we have       𝑙𝑙𝐶𝐶𝑙𝑙𝜓𝜓 = 𝜙𝜙𝜙𝜙 𝑙𝑙𝐶𝐶𝑙𝑙(𝑤𝑤 −𝑤𝑤𝑐𝑐) + 𝜙𝜙𝜇𝜇 𝑙𝑙𝐶𝐶𝑙𝑙𝐿𝐿+ (1 − 𝜙𝜙) 𝑙𝑙𝐶𝐶𝑙𝑙�(1 − 𝜏𝜏)(1 − 𝛼𝛼)𝐴𝐴𝐾𝐾𝛼𝛼𝐿𝐿𝛽𝛽𝐺𝐺1−𝛼𝛼 − 𝑤𝑤𝐿𝐿�    .                                  (A. 1) 
The first order optimality conditions of maximization of 𝑙𝑙𝐶𝐶𝑙𝑙𝜓𝜓 with respect to w and L are 
given by           𝜙𝜙𝜙𝜙
𝑤𝑤 − 𝑤𝑤𝑐𝑐
+ (1 − 𝜙𝜙)(−𝐿𝐿)
𝜋𝜋
= 0         ;                                                                                         (𝐴𝐴. 2) 
and  
       𝜙𝜙𝜇𝜇
𝐿𝐿
+ (1 − 𝜙𝜙){(1 − 𝜏𝜏)(1 − 𝛼𝛼)𝛽𝛽𝑌𝑌𝐿𝐿 − 𝑤𝑤}
𝜋𝜋
= 0   .                                                                    (𝐴𝐴. 3) 
Using equations (A.2) and (A.3), we obtain        (𝜙𝜙 − 𝜇𝜇)𝑤𝑤 = 𝜙𝜙(1 − 𝜏𝜏)(1 − 𝛼𝛼)𝛽𝛽 𝑌𝑌
𝐿𝐿
− 𝜇𝜇𝑤𝑤𝑐𝑐          .                                                                    (𝐴𝐴. 4) 
Using equations (1), (5), (7), (A.2) and (A.4) we obtain equation (9) in the body of the paper. 
Using equations (1), (7), (9) and (A.3) we obtain equation (10) in the body of the paper.  
Second order conditions: 
From equations (A.2) and (A.3), we obtain respectively        𝜕𝜕2𝑙𝑙𝐶𝐶𝑙𝑙𝜓𝜓
𝜕𝜕𝑤𝑤2
= − 𝜙𝜙𝜙𝜙(𝑤𝑤 − 𝑤𝑤𝑐𝑐)2 − (1 − 𝜙𝜙)𝐿𝐿2𝜋𝜋2 < 0    ;                                                                       (𝐴𝐴. 5) 
and       𝜕𝜕2𝑙𝑙𝐶𝐶𝑙𝑙𝜓𝜓
𝜕𝜕𝐿𝐿2
= −𝜙𝜙𝜇𝜇
𝐿𝐿2
−
(1 − 𝜙𝜙)
𝜋𝜋
�(1 − 𝜏𝜏)(1 − 𝛼𝛼)𝛽𝛽(1 − 𝛽𝛽) 𝑌𝑌
𝐿𝐿2
�
−
(1 − 𝜙𝜙)
𝜋𝜋2
�(1 − 𝜏𝜏)(1 − 𝛼𝛼)𝛽𝛽 𝑌𝑌
𝐿𝐿
− 𝑤𝑤�
2 < 0    .                                                 (𝐴𝐴. 6) 
Again from equation (A.2), we have  
      𝜕𝜕2𝑙𝑙𝐶𝐶𝑙𝑙𝜓𝜓
𝜕𝜕𝐿𝐿𝜕𝜕𝑤𝑤
= − (1 − 𝜙𝜙)
𝜋𝜋2
�(1 − 𝜏𝜏)(1 − 𝛼𝛼)𝐴𝐴𝐾𝐾𝛼𝛼𝐿𝐿𝛽𝛽𝐺𝐺1−𝛼𝛼(1 − 𝛽𝛽)�   .                                       (𝐴𝐴. 7) 
From equations (7), (1), (5), (9) and (10), we have       𝜋𝜋2 = 𝑤𝑤𝑐𝑐2𝐿𝐿2 � (1 − 𝛽𝛽)(1 − 𝜙𝜙){𝜙𝜙𝜇𝜇 + 𝛽𝛽(1 − 𝜙𝜙) − 𝜙𝜙𝜙𝜙(1 − 𝛽𝛽)} �2   .                                                             (𝐴𝐴. 8) 
Using equations (5), (9), (A.7) and (A.8), we have       𝜕𝜕2𝑙𝑙𝐶𝐶𝑙𝑙𝜓𝜓
𝜕𝜕𝐿𝐿𝜕𝜕𝑤𝑤
= − [1 − 𝜙𝜙 + 𝜙𝜙𝜇𝜇]{𝜙𝜙𝜇𝜇 + 𝛽𝛽(1 − 𝜙𝜙) − 𝜙𝜙𝜙𝜙(1 − 𝛽𝛽)}(1 − 𝛽𝛽)𝐿𝐿𝑤𝑤𝑐𝑐(1 − 𝜙𝜙)       .                                     (𝐴𝐴. 9) 
From equations (5) and (10), we have       𝑤𝑤 − 𝑤𝑤𝑐𝑐 = 𝑤𝑤𝑐𝑐 � 𝜙𝜙𝜙𝜙(1 − 𝛽𝛽)𝜙𝜙𝜇𝜇 + 𝛽𝛽(1 − 𝜙𝜙) − 𝜙𝜙𝜙𝜙(1 − 𝛽𝛽)�        .                                                          (𝐴𝐴. 10) 
Using equations (A.5), (A.8) and (A.10), we have         𝜕𝜕2𝑙𝑙𝐶𝐶𝑙𝑙𝜓𝜓
𝜕𝜕𝑤𝑤2
= − {𝜙𝜙𝜇𝜇 + 𝛽𝛽(1 − 𝜙𝜙) − 𝜙𝜙𝜙𝜙(1 − 𝛽𝛽)}2
𝑤𝑤𝑐𝑐2(1 − 𝛽𝛽)2𝜙𝜙𝜙𝜙(1 − 𝜙𝜙) [1 − 𝜙𝜙 + 𝜙𝜙𝜙𝜙]       .                              (𝐴𝐴. 11) 
From equations (A.6), (1), (5), (A.8), (10) we have          𝜕𝜕2𝑙𝑙𝐶𝐶𝑙𝑙𝜓𝜓
𝜕𝜕𝐿𝐿2
= − 1
𝐿𝐿2
�
(1 − 𝜙𝜙 + 𝜙𝜙𝜇𝜇)[𝜙𝜙𝜇𝜇 + 𝛽𝛽(1 − 𝜙𝜙)](1 − 𝜙𝜙) �       .                                                  (𝐴𝐴. 12) 
 Now using equations (A.9), (A.11) and (A.12), we have  
⇒   �𝜕𝜕2𝑙𝑙𝐶𝐶𝑙𝑙𝜓𝜓
𝜕𝜕𝑤𝑤2
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𝜕𝜕𝐿𝐿2
� − �
𝜕𝜕2𝑙𝑙𝐶𝐶𝑙𝑙𝜓𝜓
𝜕𝜕𝐿𝐿𝜕𝜕𝑤𝑤
�
2 = {𝜙𝜙𝜇𝜇 + 𝛽𝛽(1 − 𝜙𝜙) − 𝜙𝜙𝜙𝜙(1 − 𝛽𝛽)}2(1 − 𝜙𝜙 + 𝜙𝜙𝜇𝜇)
𝐿𝐿2𝑤𝑤𝑐𝑐
2(1 − 𝛽𝛽)2(1 − 𝜙𝜙)2                                      .   �[1 − 𝜙𝜙 + 𝜙𝜙𝜙𝜙][𝜙𝜙𝜇𝜇 + 𝛽𝛽(1 − 𝜙𝜙)]
𝜙𝜙𝜙𝜙
− [1 − 𝜙𝜙 + 𝜙𝜙𝜇𝜇]�      .                 (𝐴𝐴. 13) 
Here, by assumption,    𝜙𝜙𝜇𝜇 + 𝛽𝛽(1 − 𝜙𝜙) − 𝜙𝜙𝜙𝜙(1 − 𝛽𝛽) > 0  . 
⇒   (1 − 𝜙𝜙 + 𝜙𝜙𝜙𝜙)[𝜙𝜙𝜇𝜇 + 𝛽𝛽(1 − 𝜙𝜙)]
𝜙𝜙𝜙𝜙
> [𝜙𝜙𝜇𝜇 + (1 − 𝜙𝜙)]      .                                                  (𝐴𝐴. 14) 
Equation (A.13) and inequality (A.14) imply that        �𝜕𝜕2𝑙𝑙𝐶𝐶𝑙𝑙𝜓𝜓
𝜕𝜕𝑤𝑤2
� . �𝜕𝜕2𝑙𝑙𝐶𝐶𝑙𝑙𝜓𝜓
𝜕𝜕𝐿𝐿2
� − �
𝜕𝜕2𝑙𝑙𝐶𝐶𝑙𝑙𝜓𝜓
𝜕𝜕𝑤𝑤𝜕𝜕𝐿𝐿
�
2 > 0   . 
Appendix B 
Derivation of equation (15): 
Using equations (13) and (14), we construct the Current Value Hamiltonian as given by            𝐻𝐻𝑐𝑐 = 𝑐𝑐1−𝜎𝜎 − 11 − 𝜎𝜎 + 𝜆𝜆[𝑤𝑤𝐿𝐿 + 𝑟𝑟𝐾𝐾 + 𝜋𝜋 + 𝑠𝑠(1 − 𝐿𝐿) − 𝑐𝑐]       .                                                (𝐵𝐵. 1) 
Here 𝜆𝜆 is the co-state variable. Maximising equation (B.1) with respect to c, we obtain the 
following first order condition.            𝑐𝑐−𝜎𝜎 − 𝜆𝜆 = 0     ;                                                                                                                        (𝐵𝐵. 2) 
Again from equation (B.1), we have            ?̇?𝜆
𝜆𝜆
= 𝜌𝜌 − 𝑟𝑟      ;                                                                                                                            (𝐵𝐵. 3) 
and from equation (B.2), we have            ?̇?𝜆
𝜆𝜆
= −𝜎𝜎 ?̇?𝑐
𝑐𝑐
        .                                                                                                                          (𝐵𝐵. 4) 
Using equations (B.3) and (B.4), we have equation (15) in the body of the paper.  
Appendix C 
Derivation of equation (22): 
From equation (21), we obtain            𝜔𝜔� = 𝑐𝑐01−𝜎𝜎[𝜌𝜌 − 𝛾𝛾(1 − 𝜎𝜎)](1 − 𝜎𝜎) + 𝑐𝑐𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑠𝑠𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶      .                                                                   (𝐶𝐶. 1) 
Here, 𝑐𝑐(0) = 𝑐𝑐0.  
From equations (2), (16), (14), (1), (10) we obtain           𝑐𝑐0 = 𝐾𝐾0 �(1 − 𝜏𝜏)𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿�𝛽𝛽 �𝐺𝐺0𝐾𝐾0�1−𝛼𝛼 + (1 − 𝜏𝜏)𝐴𝐴𝛽𝛽𝑋𝑋(1 − 𝐿𝐿�)𝐴𝐴 �𝐺𝐺0𝐾𝐾0�1−𝛼𝛼 − 𝛾𝛾�        .             (𝐶𝐶. 2) 
Using equations (3) and (15), we obtain            𝜌𝜌 + 𝜎𝜎𝛾𝛾
𝛼𝛼𝐿𝐿�𝛽𝛽
= �𝐺𝐺0
𝐾𝐾0
�
1−𝛼𝛼 (1 − 𝜏𝜏)𝐴𝐴         .                                                                                       (𝐶𝐶. 3) 
Using equations (C.2) and (C.3), we obtain            𝑐𝑐0 = 𝐾𝐾0 �𝜌𝜌�𝐿𝐿�𝛽𝛽 + 𝐴𝐴𝛽𝛽𝑋𝑋(1 − 𝐿𝐿�)� + 𝛾𝛾�𝜎𝜎𝐿𝐿�𝛽𝛽 + 𝜎𝜎𝐴𝐴𝛽𝛽𝑋𝑋�1 − 𝐿𝐿�� − 𝛼𝛼𝐿𝐿�𝛽𝛽�𝛼𝛼𝐿𝐿�𝛽𝛽 �        .                   (𝐶𝐶. 4) 
Using equations (C.1) and (C.4), we obtain   
          𝜔𝜔� = 𝐾𝐾01−𝜎𝜎 �𝜌𝜌�𝐿𝐿�𝛽𝛽 + 𝐴𝐴𝛽𝛽𝑋𝑋�1 − 𝐿𝐿��� + 𝛾𝛾�𝜎𝜎𝐿𝐿�𝛽𝛽 + 𝜎𝜎𝐴𝐴𝛽𝛽𝑋𝑋�1 − 𝐿𝐿�� − 𝛼𝛼𝐿𝐿�𝛽𝛽�𝛼𝛼𝐿𝐿�𝛽𝛽 �1−𝜎𝜎[𝜌𝜌 − 𝛾𝛾(1 − 𝜎𝜎)](1 − 𝜎𝜎)                                                           +𝑐𝑐𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑠𝑠𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶      .                                                                          (𝐶𝐶. 5) 
Equation (C.5) is identical to the equation (22) in the body of the paper.   
 
